A few thoughts about what transpires to have happened in Ukraine over the last, say, one month – in turn resulting in what we’ve seen in the last few days…
To start with, mind July and August, and President Zelensky’s announcements about ‘big offensive in the south’. Many have belittled him. Actually, it doesn't matter what the ‘others’ - whether in Russia or outside - think. In Russia, all that matters is what just one person thinks. That’s Putin.
While not learning anything at all about military strategy and tactics in six months of war (besides, why should a mafia-boss like Putin start giving in to his incompetent subordinates like Shoygu or Gerasimov…?), Putin did learn one lesson that is of particular importance to him. He learned to take Zelensky seriously. Thus, he took his announcement about the offensive very seriously: this was a threat for his intention to run a ‘refendum’ for ‘Anschluss’ of Kherson Oblast to Russia.
This is as important because – as reported by some of last few authoritative instances within the mainstream media at least back in May (i.e. as supposed to be well-known) – Putin is micromanaging the VSRF in this war. He’s all the time ignoring the normal chain of command: ignoring the Ministry of Defence (Shoygu & Co), ignoring the GenStab (Gerasimov & Co.) and issuing orders directly to commanders of VSRF’s ‘field armies’ (different combined arms armies, and corpses.)
Putin is ex-KGB, but has no formal military education. Nevertheless, from his behaviour (in the public) over the last 20+ years, he was taking great care to position himself as a ‘great military strategist and commander’ in the Russian public.
Precisely this combination – Putin’s own illusions of grandeur and his lack of military education - are resulting in the VSRF’s doctrine, strategy, and tactics being ‘thrown out of the window’, and that every single day since 24 February 2022.
Instead of ‘softening up’ Ukrainian defences, Putin ordered a heliborne strike on downtown Kyiv. This ended in multiple VDV units being shot to pieces. When that didn’t work, he ordered ground assaults into Kyiv and Kharkiv. With same results. Ever since, he’s ordering one assault on heavily-fortified Ukrainian villages and towns after the other… with unavoidable consequences – because: the VSRF was designed for a fast-paced mechanised advance, but over the open terrain _around_ urban areas, not for assaults on heavily fortified areas. Meanwhile, this is going so far that the VSRF was lately concentrating 2-3-4 artillery brigades to pound a heavily fortified sector of 200 metres by 500 metres – in order to enable its infantry to advance…right to the entrance of the next village…
Actually, from the Russian point of view: this is completely insane. Even more so considering this was little else but using the same tool like the last three-four months (and then one still against the VSRF’s doctrine), but still expecting to achieve a different result…?
This is why Ukrainian troops on the front can’t stop wondering about behaviour of Russian forces, and why are they frequently concluding, ‘good they’re that stupid’.
Bottom line: the VSRF can’t be successful, no matter what it does. Actually, under the given circumstances, I doubt even the US Army or the Israeli Defence Force would be successful if given the same task and commanded by Putin: no military force can be successful if constantly operating against its doctrine, strategy, equipment, and training.
Now add the endemic corruption within the VSRF (only made worse since Putin is in change, but especially since Putin appointed Shoygu – and that on insistence from within the VSRF), consider the endemic corruption within the Russian defence sector, and don’t forget Putin’s practice of appointing favourites into top command positions..
That’s the ‘strategic level’. Now, lets have a look at the operational level.
In August, Putin rushed major reinforcements to Kherson Oblast. Don’t recall, right now, how much was that? 10, 12, 15, 20 battalion tactical groups? Mostly from the VDV. Such a massive reinforcement required stripping down large sectors of the ‘frontline’ (actually ‘a line of fortified strongholds’) elsewhere. Arguably, the VDV wasn’t holding the ‘frontline’, anywhere. But: it was always kept in reserve, 20-70km behind it. Now, this reserve was away.
Apparently, Putin considered ‘holding the line’ by Separatists and few Rosgvardia/SOBR and similar assets for ‘enough’ and ‘possible’, at least, as long as this enabled the Separatists – supported by VSRF-artillery – to ‘continue’ their advances at different points along the LOC. Apparently, he thus ‘maintained the initiative’, held the ZSU on its toes…
In Kherson, the VDV received the task of securing the conquest and the referendum. The area they had to defend was actually still too large for the available force, but that was all they had. August passed, and belittling of Ukraine grew stronger… even more so as Moscow then demonstratively announced sending that III Army Corps to Ukraine – to buy time until this would reinforce the 'frontlines'.
Well, the Ukrainians didn’t wait. They attacked in Kherson.
The first reaction – in Russia and in the West – was: ‘failure’. Why? Because punching through a fortified frontline is resulting in losses. They are sad, tragic, but unavoidable. And nothing is a better tool for such a task but main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles – which in turn are such ‘sexy motives’ when caught on videos while being hit, or afterwards. With other words: because the mass of observers simply does not understand what do they get to see…
Meanwhile – though after lots of careful reconnaissance, resulting in the conclusion that there was a large part of south-eastern Kharkiv Oblast only thinly protected – Ukrainians attacked in south-eastern Kharkiv, too.
As of this morning, this resulted in the following situation:
Kherson:
- North, the Russians have managed to establish a new frontline, 10-15km south of the original one; Ukrainians are assaulting the same;
- Centre, Ukrainians have punched through the next Russian frontline (planned centre was Chkalove) before Russians could establish the same;
- South, Ukrainians have taken the centre of the Russian frontline; Russians are still managing to hold them up.
Kharkiv:
Contrary to Kherson, where many of involved ZSU units are relatively new and untried, those involved in this operation are (mostly) highly-experienced (see: 3rd Tank, but especially the 92nd Airborne). They punched through the thinly-occupied Russian defence line at Verbivka, then didn’t waste their time with securing Balakleya, but by-passed it and drove north and east. Then they by-passed Yakovenkove, and by-passed Volkhiv Yar. The follow-up unit then overrun a weak BTG of the VDV as this was still trying to organise the defence of Volkhiv Yar (mopping up is still going on). Finally, and supported by a new push from the West down the P07 highway, the lead Ukrainian unit by-passed Shevchenkove to reach Hurshivka. That’s 12km west of Kupyansk.
Further south, no idea along which route, but RUMINT has it the ZSU has reached Synykha and Senkove on the Oskil River today; and in the south, there are not only reports about fighting in Savyntsi, but also on approaches to Izyum.
How comes such a rapid advance?
Because except for that weak BTG VDV, there was absolutely nothing behind the Russian 'frontline'. No minefields, no fortifications, no strongholds and no other Russian units capable of launching counterattacks. For comparison: in Kherson, the reinforced VDV still had few reserve units in the rear. If nothing else, Ukrainian advance was slowed down for long enough to bring at least 2-4 additional BTGs from the Crimea and southern Zaporizhzhya. In south-eastern Kharkiv, behind the frontline held by ‘volunteers’ from the LNR and DPR, the Russians had nothing else but SOBR police, headquarters, supply depots, and air defence units.
‘Simply logical results’ – entirely based on Putin systematically violating all the Russian laws of warfare, and driving the VSRF into oblivion.
Considering the ‘fundaments’ for all of this are well-known, the question is rather: why is anybody surprised? ….or has it ‘hard to believe’….?
For the end, and before anybody asks something like, ‘how far can Ukrainians advance’: as far as their logistics is capable of keeping their forwardmost troops supplied with fuel and ammo. Sure, they can use some of what they capture underway, but sooner or later troops are going to start falling asleep, at least…
It’s the same on the other side: how quickly can the Russians bring sufficient reinforcements, ammo, and fuel to points at which they might slow down, even stop the Ukrainian advance. I would say: that’s going to take 2-3 days, at least.
Have no doubts, this is going to happen, sooner or later. It’s always happening.
Thus, let me remind everybody: sadly, this is no ‘end of war’. No ‘final victory’. Just a (very) positive development in two of this war's ‘episodes’. Keep cool, please.
Originariamente Scritto da Manu
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